An Alliance in Crisis?

Tuesday, August 21st, 2007
by CAMPUS Archives

Fifty-five miles west of Prague in the historic Czech city of Plzen, famous for brewing the world’s supply of Pilsner-Urquell beer, a memorial stands in honor of General George S. Patton and the American troops under his command who liberated the Nazi-occupied city in May of 1945. This memorial is a testament to American military power advancing human liberty, but freedom for the Czech people was nothing but a lofty dream during the ensuing 43-year nightmare of communist rule. The monument, erected in 2005, symbolized the enduring gratitude the Czech government and people had for America at a time when Europe’s relationship with the United States was characterized by the frosty speeches of Jacques Chirac and Gerhard Schroeder. The mayor of Plzen told U.S. Ambassador Richard Graber, “Plzen is more American than some American cities,” Graber recounted in an interview. But there are signs that goodwill and warm feelings may not be enough to sustain the most important geostrategic initiative ever attempted during the post-Cold War U.S.-Czech relationship: the installation of a U.S. radar system in the Czech Republic as part of a missile defense shield for Europe.

Following North Korea’s testing of a nuclear weapon last fall, and in light of Iran’s unceasing nuclear ambitions, the U.S. announced in January 2007 its desire to place ten missile interceptors in Poland and a radar system in the Czech Republic in order to provide Europe with a missile defense shield and add another layer to its own defense capabilities. Although the United States has agreed to foot the bill of over $750 million for the radar system, political problems immediately arose, placing the fledgling proposal in jeopardy. Various constituencies led by the opposition party Social Democrats and Communists began raising concerns that the radar would make the Czech Republic a terrorist target, as well as the target of Russia, which has opposed the plan with increasingly bellicose rhetoric.

All of these factors combined so that Czech public opinion polls have consistently showed opposition to the radar plan hovering around 60%. The Social Democrats and Communists are calling for a national referendum the system’s deployment, and the center-right Civic Democrat president Vaclav Klaus, known for a typically pugnacious personality most recently displayed with his remarks deriding global warming alarmists, recently conceded in an August 3 interview with Radio Free Europe that “I think this opposition should be respected. It is real…No one is faking the polls that are being taken.” Yet, Klaus is not willing to give up on the program, saying that Czech politicians need to explain to Czech citizens “what the threat level is” and “indicate the reason for expressing our loyalty to the USA.”

In other words, politicians must not only clearly explain the seriousness of the Iranian threat, but also why deterring this threat is of greater importance than incurring the wrath of Russia. This is no easy task. Many Czechs do not see radical Islamism as a grave threat since the number of radical Muslims in the Czech Republic is miniscule. Prague did face the possibility of a terrorist attack when Radio Free Europe, located in the heart of the city, was cased by Iraqi diplomat and likely spy Samir al-Ani. But whatever impact these events had on Czech public opinion, concern about terrorism was deflated after initial reports that al-Ani was connected with 9/11 ringleader Mohammad Atta were disputed by many in American and Czech intelligence circles (although the reports were never proven to be false).

With the Czech populace relatively unworried about Iran’s nuclear threat, the red-hot rhetoric emanating from Moscow in opposition to missile defense has made many Czech citizens apprehensive about cooperating with the United States. In a May 10 speech celebrating the end of World War II, Russian president Vladimir Putin implicitly compared the United States to Nazi Germany, referring to the new threats today that are similar to those “during the time of the Third Reich,” which embodied “the same contempt for human life and the same claims of exceptionality and diktat in the world.” Later that month, Russia tested an Intercontinental Ballistic Missile and threatened to aim its missiles at European cities if the missile defense system is deployed. The United States insists, however, that the proposed system would be incapable of defending Europe against a Russian attack. The U.S. would only place ten interceptors in Poland, hardly capable of stopping or stemming the damage of a Russian nuclear attack, since Russia is permitted to keep 1,700 to 2,200 nuclear warheads under existing treaty. Furthermore, defenses in Poland would be incapable of thwarting a Russian attack on the United States since the flight path of Russian missiles is beyond the interceptors reach.

Russia’s most realistic concern is that the U.S. is simply trying to get its foot in the door, which would make it much easier to deploy more advanced missile defense systems in the future that could completely neutralize Russia’s missile capabilities. Major-General Vladimir Belousov of the Russian Academy of Sciences World Economics and International Relations Institute recently said that “as the potential of the missile defence system is extended, the danger will only grow.” The U.S. would likely have a much easier time placing more sophisticated missile defense systems in Poland once the initial interceptors were there. Yet, Russia has demonstrated that it is more concerned about losing its ability to threaten and intimidate other nations than it is about protecting itself. When Putin suggested in June that he would favor a U.S. missile defense system in Azerbaijan, a former Soviet republic, the U.S. responded that it would be willing to cooperate, so long as deployment to Azerbaijan was in addition to installing the system in Poland and the Czech Republic. But Russia quickly countered that it would not agree to missile defense in Poland and the Czech Republic, even though these are the only locations that could protect Europe from an Iranian missile attack.

While the United States has demonstrated the political will to place the security of its allies above appeasing Russia, it remains to be seen if the Czechs will stand up to their hostile neighbor to the east. Vaclav Klaus chalks up concerns about missile defense in part to the historical Czech experience with occupying Soviet forces. “People have their own historical experience and will always be against having large military bases nearby,” Klaus told Radio Free Europe. But Czech experiences with communism should have proven that the American army is in no way morally equivalent to the imperial Soviet force.

If anything, the Czech experience with the Soviets demonstrated an uncomfortable historical fact that the Czechs have been less than stalwart when standing up to their enemies. Douglas Lytle, an American ex-pat living in Prague following the Cold War observed quite bluntly that “Poles will fight and lose, Serbs will fight endlessly, Russians will attack, but the Czechs will lie back and have the crap kicked out of them, despite attempts by Czech leaders to promote a stronger national identity.” It is that sense of national identity that Czech politicians must cultivate today in order to secure the liberty and independence that nation has enjoyed for the past two decades.

Czech politicians looking to history as a guide for the future would do well to make a pilgrimage to the memorial to Patton’s army at Plzen and recall not only that the American military has a tradition of being used as a force for good, but also that its efforts at liberation have fallen short only because of a lack of political will—not a lack of military power. While Patton wanted to march forward and liberate Prague, U.S. appeasers at Yalta had offered up Prague to Stalin. Today, the U.S. is willing to devote the money, men and political capital to march forward and defend Czech liberty. But the Czech people must decide for themselves if they will appease Russia or stand with their allies in America.

John McCormack was a participant in the Collegiate Network’s 2007 Geostrategic Journalism Course which takes place in Washington D.C. and Prague, Czech Republic. John recently graduated from George Washington University where he served as Editor in Chief of The GW Patriot. He is currently deputy online editor at The Weekly Standard.

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